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Abstract
This paper describes the main results from the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network 
(WDN) survey. Its main goal is to provide information on demand, fi nance conditions and 
other factors determining economic activity, on wage, price and employment adjustments 
over the period 2010-2013, and on fi rms’ perceptions of institutional changes in the labour 
market. In Spain, the survey was conducted at the end of 2014, collecting information from 
a representative sample of 1,975 Spanish fi rms covering manufacturing, energy and market 
services sectors. The main results show that Spanish fi rms’ adjustment to falling demand 
and other negative conditions since 2010 relied heavily on the dismissal of employees under 
temporary contracts, although those fi rms most affected by the crisis also signifi cantly 
reduced permanent employment. On the contrary, wage and hours adjustments remained 
limited even in those fi rms most severely affected by the negative shocks. Regarding 
institutional changes, Spanish fi rms perceive some easing in the conditions for economic 
layoffs, attributing the main source of this higher fl exibility to legal changes since 2010. As 
to other labour conditions, including wages and hours, the share of fi rms perceiving higher 
fl exibility is somewhat lower. 
Keywords: survey, wages, employment, shocks
JEL classifi cation: J23, J30, J50. 
Resumen
Este documento describe los principales resultados de la tercera ola de la encuesta española 
sobre formación de salarios realizada en el marco de la red de investigación del ESCB sobre 
la dinámica salarial (WDN, por sus siglas en inglés). Su principal objetivo es proporcionar 
información sobre la demanda, las condiciones de fi nanciación y otros factores que 
determinan la actividad económica, sobre los ajustes salariales, de precios y de empleo en 
el período 2010-2013, y sobre la percepción de los cambios institucionales en el mercado 
de trabajo de las empresas. La encuesta se realizó a fi nales de 2014 a partir de una muestra 
representativa de 1.975 empresas españolas que cubren los sectores de manufactura, la 
energía y los servicios de mercado. Los principales resultados muestran que el ajuste de las 
empresas españolas a la caída de la demanda y otras condiciones negativas desde 2010 
se basó en gran medida en el despido de los empleados con contratos temporales, aunque 
las empresas más afectadas por la crisis también redujeron signifi cativamente el empleo 
permanente. Por el contrario, los ajustes de salarios y horas fueron limitados, incluso en 
aquellas empresas más afectadas por los shocks negativos. En cuanto a los cambios 
institucionales, las empresas españolas perciben cierta fl exibilización en las condiciones 
de los despidos económicos, atribuyendo esta mayor fl exibilidad a los cambios legales 
desde el año 2010. En cuanto a las demás condiciones de trabajo, incluidos los salarios y 
las horas, la proporción de empresas que perciben una mayor fl exibilidad es algo inferior. 
Palabras clave: encuesta, salarios, empleo, perturbaciones.
Códigos JEL: J23, J30, J50.
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1 Introduction
This report presents an overview of the main results of a fi rm survey conducted under the 
Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) – a joint venture of the European System of Central Banks – 
referred to Spain over the period 2010-2013. The main purposes of the survey were to provide 
information on demand, fi nance conditions and other factors determining economic activity, on 
wage, price and employment adjustments to those factors, and on perceptions of structural 
and institutional changes in the labour market for a representative sample of fi rms. Building 
on two previous surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009 under the same WDN,1 the aim of this 
new initiative was to construct a harmonised cross-country microeconomic dataset that could 
be used for research into a wide array of questions on wage and price setting and the other 
main instruments of adjustment that fi rms implement in response to changing economic and 
institutional conditions.
In what follows, we fi rst put in context the information obtained through the WDN 
Survey by describing the main macroeconomic and labour market developments in Spain over 
the period 2010-2013. Then, after briefl y describing the main characteristics of the 3rd wave of 
the WDN survey (WDN3), we document the sources of changing economic conditions and the 
fi rms’ wage, price and employment responses to them. Since during the period under study 
signifi cant labour market reforms modifi ed the institutional context in which fi rms’ decisions were 
taken, we also focus on how fi rms perceived these institutional changes and to what extent they 
think they will lead to different adjustment patterns in the future. Main results show that Spanish 
fi rms’ adjustment to falling demand and other negative conditions since 2010 relied heavily on 
the reduction of employees under temporary contracts, although those fi rms most affected by 
the crisis also signifi cantly reduced permanent employment. On the contrary, wage and hours 
adjustment remained limited even in those fi rms more severely affected by the negative shocks. 
In the case of wages, the WDN survey shows signifi cant evidence of downward nominal wage 
rigidity with around 20% of fi rms freezing wages over the reference period and some decrease in 
wage indexation, partly due to the recent decrease in infl ation. Regarding institutional changes, 
almost 50% of fi rms perceive some easing in the conditions for economic layoffs, individual 
and collective alike, with legal changes since 2010 being the main driving factor of this higher 
fl exibility. On the wage side, the share of fi rms perceiving higher possibilities for wage adjustment 
is lower, between one-quarter and one-third for incumbent and entry workers, respectively, 
and the role of legal changes in this higher fl exibility seems to be less relevant. A similar picture 
emerges regarding hours adjustment, with around 30% of fi rms declaring higher possibilities to 
adjust working hours but, as in the case of wages, with a less relevant role for legal changes. 
In both cases, a change in workers’ attitude, possibly related also to the adverse economic 
conditions, is mentioned as a crucial factor for explaining higher adjustment possibilities.
1  See Wage Dynamics in Europe: Final Report of the Wage Dynamics Network, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
home/pdf/wdn_fi nalreport_dec2009.pdf
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2  Recent developments in the Spanish labour market: putting the WDN3 
Survey in context
The impact of the crisis on the Spanish labour market was very intense. From the peak in 
employment in the third quarter of 2008, more than 3.6 million jobs were lost in the Spanish 
economy (almost 18%), although the recent recovery has started to reduce this loss. Thus, 
employment in the fi rst quarter of 2015 stood at a similar level to that recorded in the Spanish 
economy in 2002 and the employment rate (with respect to the working-age population) has 
fallen to 57.3%, about 10 percentage points (pp) below the maximum level seen before the 
crisis. Job losses were highest among workers with temporary contracts (more than 1.7 million 
between 2008 and 2013), reducing the weight of temporary employment in total employees by 
almost 9 pp to 23.6% in the fi rst quarter of 2015. 
The intensity of job losses refl ects the intensity of the decline in economic activity (see 
Chart 1). Over the reference period of the WDN3 Survey (2010-2013), GDP accumulated a 
decline of 8%, although the growth observed since the third quarter of 2013 has reduced this 
cumulative drop to 6.5%. Thus, this sharp deterioration in the labour market seen since the 
beginning of the crisis in 2008 unfolded in different phases. The initial phase of the crisis was 
characterised by very sharp job losses, with decreases that exceeded 6%, in annual terms, in 
several quarters of 2009, driven by the sharp decline in GDP and the upturn in labour productivity. 
Thereafter, the rate of decline of employment tended to soften, helped by some recovery in GDP 
over the course of 2010. However, this recovery was not sustained and led to a double-dip 
recession from early 2011 that once more intensifi ed job losses. In this relapse, although rates of 
decline in employment were not as sharp as those observed in 2009, employment accumulated 
a further decline of around another 8% taking it to its cyclical trough in late 2013. Since then, a 
signifi cant recovery in employment has been observed, allowing growth of 3% in the fi rst quarter 
of 2015 supported by a parallel recovery in economic activity.
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GDP, EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGES CHART 1
SOURCE: Quarterly National Accounts, INE. 
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Regarding labour costs, wages failed to react to the strong deterioration of the labour 
market in the fi rst phase of the crisis and, indeed, real wages increased in 2008-09, even after 
controlling for the strong composition effects in employment (see Galan and Puente, 2013). 
Afterwards, wages started to show a higher sensitivity to cyclical conditions, leading to a 
decrease in real wages over 2012 and 2013, while since 2014 very low, or even negative, 
infl ation has reduced the scope for further real wage adjustment.
As for institutional changes, Royal Decree-Law  3/2012, approved in February 2012, 
included a broad set of changes to labour market institutions. With regard to collective bargaining, 
and in order to increase the degree of decentralisation in a system where most collective agreements 
are signed at a sectoral level (only around 10% of workers are affected by fi rm-level contracts), it 
was established that fi rm-level agreements should prevail in a broad set of areas (basic wage, 
supplements, overtime remuneration and the distribution of working hours), with contradictory 
clauses in industry-level agreements being ineffective. Also, in order to increase fi rms’ internal 
fl exibility, the possibilities were widened for opting out from the terms and conditions contained in 
the agreement in force. In this case, the situation before 2010 made the possibilities for fi rms to opt 
out of sectoral-level agreements practically inexistent, despite adverse economic shocks, given that 
conditions for opting out were established at the sectoral level. In 2010, a fi rst attempt to increase 
these possibilities was made, making it easier, under the agreement with workers’ representatives, 
to opt out in the presence of poor economic conditions. The 2012 reform additionally increased 
these possibilities, simplifying, to some extent, the procedure in the event of disagreement with 
workers’ representatives. Also, this reform allowed unilateral changes to be made to working 
conditions, including wages and working hours, that exceed the minimum levels established in the 
collective agreement in instances of an adverse economic situation without the need for reaching 
an agreement with workers’ representatives. Finally, to encourage faster renegotiation, the reform 
established a maximum limit of one year for the effectiveness of an agreement after its termination.
In the area of dismissal costs and fi ring procedures, a number of measures were 
taken. On one hand, the economic grounds for dismissal were re-defi ned, establishing objective 
circumstances that justify termination of contract. In particular, it was determined that termination 
is justifi ed if the fi rm reports losses (or expects to) or suffers three consecutive quarters of year-on-
year declines in sales or revenues. On the other, the amount of compensation payable in the event 
of unjustifi ed dismissal was reduced; for objective and disciplinary dismissals it was set at 33 days 
per year of service, subject to a maximum of 24 months’ pay (as against 45 days and a maximum 
of 42 months’ pay previously). As for fi ring procedures, the need for administrative authorisation 
for collective dismissals was eliminated, as was the obligation on the part of the fi rm to pay wages 
for the period between the time of notifi cation of dismissal and fi nal judicial resolution.
In relation to hiring possibilities, a new type of permanent contract, called an 
“entrepreneurial contract”, was introduced for fi rms with fewer than 50 employees, with a 
probation period that has been extended to one year and various tax incentives. In addition, 
some of the terms and conditions of the training and apprenticeship contract and those relating 
to part-time hiring were made more fl exible.
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3 Main characteristics of the WDN3 survey
The WDN3 Survey was conducted in the September-December 2014 period. The questionnaire 
included core questions, harmonised with the rest of the participating countries, combined with 
non-core questions, mostly on price-setting, and some country-specifi c questions, mostly about 
recent legislative changes introduced in the Spanish labour market. The initial sample of the 
survey was of 3,049 fi rms with more than 5 employees in the manufacturing, energy and market 
services sectors.2 Sampling design was stratifi ed by sector and size using a population of fi rms 
from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce records. Firms´ responses were 
collected on a voluntary basis by an external fi rm and questionnaires were mainly completed 
using a web platform. The response rate was 64.8%, so the sample size is 1,975 replies (see 
Table 1 for the distribution of the response rate by size or industry). Results are presented in this 
report using fi rms’ weights3 calculated to adjust for differences in response rates across strata 
(sector/size) and differences in the sampling probability. 
2 As in previous WDN surveys in Spain, agriculture, construction and non-market services sectors were excluded.
3 In some cases, we also use employment weights, in order to check for signifi cant differences across fi rms’ size classes.
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
Initial sample Share of ?rms (%) Replies Share of ?rms (%) Response rate (%)
Sector
    Manufacturing 758 97 506 97 67
    Energy 23 3 18 3 78
    Trade 916 117 600 115 66
    Business services 1,352 173 851 162 63
Size
    0-20 2,280 292 1,441 275 63
    20-50 490 63 354 68 72
    50-200 214 27 133 25 62
    >200 65 8 47 9 72
TOTAL 3,049 100 1,975 100 65
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR AND SIZE AND RESPONSE RATE  TABLE 1 
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4 Sources of shocks between 2010 and 2013 and firms’ responses
We now document Spanish fi rms’ perceptions about the size and type of shocks affecting 
them during the period 2010-2013, and to what extent those shocks led to employment and 
wage changes. The main results in what follows are: i) falls in demand were very signifi cant and 
widespread across fi rms; ii) in response to the shocks, wages were frozen, rather than cut, in a 
great majority of fi rms; and iii) employment changes took place mostly through the reduction of 
the number of employees with temporary contracts. 
First, as seen in Table 2, when facing the options of changes in demand, higher 
uncertainty, problems in access to external fi nance, reductions in customers’ ability to pay and 
lower availability of supplies, Spanish fi rms reported that lack of demand was the main problem 
they had to deal with during this period (more than 70% of fi rms said they underwent a strong 
or moderate decrease in demand, while only 15.4% of fi rms reported their demand to increase 
over this period. This fall in demand had mostly a national component, since 65% of fi rms 
reported a decrease in domestic demand, and only 30.2% a decrease in external demand. 
Moreover, 40% of fi rms reported an increase in external demand over this period, which is again 
consistent with the sound performance of exports.
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
Strong
decrease
Moderate
decrease No change
Moderate
increase
Level of demand 30.1 40.6 13.8 14.3
    Domestic demand 27.3 37.5 19.7 14.4
    External demand 7.1 23.0 29.9 32.5
Volatility/uncertainty about demand 18.5 26.9 28.0 19.6
Access to external ?nance 19.7 24.4 50.4 4.7
Customer´s ability to pay 19.2 40.3 36.3 3.5
Availability of supplies 3.6 17.8 71.8 6.0
CHANGE IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 TABLE 2 
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
Transitory Partially persistent
Credit was not available To ?nance working capital 32.7
To ?nance new investment 32.9
To re?nance debt 29.6
Conditions were too onerous To ?nance working capital 38.5
To ?nance new investment 38.1
To re?nance debt 34.5
DIFFICULTIES IN ACCESS TO FINANCE IN 2010/2013. % FIRMS 
REPORTING THE FOLLOWING AS RELEVANT OR VERY RELEVANT 
TABLE 3 
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Besides demand, fi rms also reported that fi nancial diffi culties were widespread: 44.1% 
of fi rms perceived a worsening in their access to external fi nance, and 59.4% also suffered 
from a diminished ability of their customers to pay. As seen in Table 3, fi nancial problems came 
mostly in the form of overly onerous credit conditions, rather than non-availability of credit, with 
not many signifi cant differences across the required credit in terms of end-purpose (fi nancing 
working capital, new investment or refi nancing debt).
As for the duration of the shocks (see Table 4), most of the shocks were perceived 
as, at least, partially persistent or permanent; only around 25% of fi rms reported they expect 
these changes to be transitory. Differences are small across the shocks considered, and it 
is noteworthy that even after fi nancing conditions have been normalised, 28.3% of fi rms still 
perceivechanges in access to external fi nance to be permanent in nature. 
Regarding differences in the impact of different shocks on fi rms according to the sector 
of activity or size, the share of fi rms reporting a fall in demand was higher in services sectors than 
in manufacturing and utilities (see left-hand panel of Chart A1 in the Appendix), which is consistent 
with the higher decrease in domestic demand over this period. Also, across sectors of activity, there 
is a signifi cant negative correlation between the share of fi rms reporting a fall in demand, and value 
added changes estimated by National Accounts (see right-hand panel of Chart A1 in the Appendix).
As for differences across fi rms, we provide some estimates of the marginal effects of 
some fi rms’ characteristics on the incidence of the shocks (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The 
main results suggest a higher negative impact of the crisis on smaller fi rms, which reported both 
higher falls in demand and greater diffi culties in access to credit, with no signifi cant differences 
in this regard across sectors of activity or other fi rm characteristics, such as ownership. 
4.1 Prices and costs
The smaller fall in foreign demand relative to domestic demand translated into a lower share of fi rms 
decreasing prices in foreign markets than in domestic markets (31.2% vs 46.1%, see Table 5). This 
behaviour is also consistent with fi rms’ perceptions about changes in the degree of competition in 
both segments of the market: 63.4% of fi rms report that competition increased over this period in 
the domestic market, while only 53.6% perceived this increase in the external market.
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
Transitory Partially persistent Permanent
Level of demand 26.7 46.8 26.4
Volatility/uncertainty about demand 23.8 51.1 25.1
Access to external ?nance 24.8 46.9 28.3
Customer´s ability to pay 25.9 51.1 23.0
Availability of supplies 26.5 52.3 21.2
DEGREE OF PERSISTENCE OF THE DIFFERENT FACTORS AFFECTING 
FIRMS OVER 2010-2013  
TABLE 4 
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 However, in this situation of lower demand, lower prices and higher competition, 
Spanish fi rms seem to have faced relevant diffi culties in adjusting their costs: more than 50% of 
Spanish fi rms reported an increase in total costs over this period as a result of increasing labour, 
fi nancing and intermediate input costs.
A relevant share of fi rms (close to 33%) managed to reduce their costs, in particular 
their labour cost component, while the share of fi rms who were able to reduce fi nancing costs 
was smaller. Reductions were more prevalent in those fi rms most affected by negative shocks 
(Chart 2): around 43% of fi rms affected by a decrease in demand or increasing diffi culties in 
access to fi nance reported a decrease in labour costs, while these percentages were 12.3% and 
23.2%, respectively, in those fi rms not negatively affected by these shocks.
4.2 Adjusting labour costs: employment and wage changes
Regarding labour costs, in Table 6 we document that a large fraction of Spanish fi rms did not 
reduce their labour costs between 2010 and 2013 despite the tough economic conditions. A fi rst 
reason was increases in base wages over this period (53.4%), although most fi rms reported this 
increase as moderate (Table 7), while reductions in base wages were quite infrequent (observed 
only in 7.5% of the fi rms). 
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
Strong decrease Moderate decrease No change Moderate increase Strong increase
Prices
    Domestic market 16.85 29.24 35.26 16.51 2.14
    External market 7.87 23.30 49.77 17.99 1.14
Competitive pressure
    Domestic market 2.25 6.84 27.54 27.89 35.49
    External market 2.46 3.92 39.99 29.77 23.86
EVOLUTION OF PRICES AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE IN THE DOMESTIC AND THE EXTERNAL MARKET 
BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 
TABLE 5 
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.15 
0.20 
0.25 
0.30 
0.35 
0.40 
0.45 
0.50 
No decrease in demand Decrease in demand No problems in access to 
?????? 
?????????????????????
?????????
 TOTAL 
  
  
  
  
% FIRMS ADJUSTING LABOUR COSTS DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF SHOCK CHART 2
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey. 
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Flexible wage components provided additional room for adjusting labour costs (almost 25% 
of fi rms reported a decrease here), but as the weight of these components in total labour costs was 
rather small (4.2%), the scope for adjusting labour costs by these means was limited. Given the limited 
adjustments in wages and hours, the main instrument to accommodate the negative shocks was a 
reduction in the number of employees. These reductions affected mostly employees under temporary 
contracts. In contrast with other European countries, adjustments of working hours did not seem to 
play a relevant role (only 16.7% of fi rms reported a reduction in working hours over this period. 
Chart 3 provides some information as to what extent fi rms´ strategies to adjust labour 
costs varied with the type and the intensity of the shocks. First, in the presence of a moderate fall 
in demand, the most common strategy for Spanish fi rms was to adjust temporary employment 
and fl exible wage components (although the share of fi rms adjusting permanent employment 
was also relatively large). 
However, there was a strikingly low presence of fi rms, with respect to those not affected 
by a negative demand shock, that adjusted base wages or hours or hours per employee. In the 
presence of a strong decrease in demand, permanent employment was the preferred means of 
adjustment while temporary employment and the adjustment of fl exible wage components were 
less relevant in this regard. It is also noteworthy that, even in the case of a strong decrease in 
demand, Spanish fi rms reported severe diffi culties in adjusting base wages and only 12.6% of 
fi rms reported having been able to reduce them.
Chart A2 in the Appendix shows that fi rms’ responses to fi nancial shocks were similar 
to those to demand shocks. In the presence of a moderate decrease in the access to fi nance, 
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
Strong decrease Moderate decrease No change Moderate increase Strong increase
Total costs 7.52 22.72 17.60 41.74 10.43
Labour costs 7.86 20.71 28.68 36.25 6.50
Financing costs 3.40 10.57 36.71 33.76 15.56
Intermediate product costs 2.42 13.76 34.69 40.79 8.34
EVOLUTION OF COSTS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 TABLE 6 
Strong decrease Moderate decrease No change Moderate increase Strong increase
Base wage 2.19 5.29 39.17 52.05 1.30
Flexible wage components 3.74 19.97 53.22 22.37 0.70
Permanent employees 6.76 24.56 35.16 29.04 4.48
Temporary employees 11.77 24.49 36.73 23.78 3.22
Working hours per employee 3.41 13.30 67.57 15.16 0.55
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey. 
CHANGES IN LABOR COSTS COMPONENTS BETWEEN 2010 AND 2013 TABLE 7
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Spanish fi rms tried to adjust labour costs by reducing temporary employees and fl exible 
wage components. Only when the lack of fi nance was most acute did both permanent and 
temporary employees and, to a lower extent, hours per employee, decrease. As in the case of 
demand shocks, base wage adjustments were quite infrequent, irrespective of the intensity of 
the fi nancial shock.
Table A2 in the Appendix provides estimates of the probability to adjust any of the 
fi ve components of labour costs considered in the WDN3 survey (base wage, fl exible wage 
components, permanent and temporary employment, and working hours per employee). We 
relate these probabilities to the size and type of shock incurred by the fi rm, size and sector of 
activity, and variables that may affect the strategy to adjust wages versus employment such 
as the type of collective bargaining agreement, having opted out of the collective bargaining 
agreement in 2013 and the share of temporary contracts. Results indicate that, as expected, 
the intensity of the negative shock matters and fi rms most affected by a decrease in demand 
had to adjust their labour cost, combining the fi ve different alternatives. In any case, it should 
be noticed that in this regard the impact of a negative demand shock was higher than that of a 
negative fi nancial shock. 
Also, regarding differences across the different components, a negative shock on 
demand led to the adjustment of employment (permanent and temporary) with higher intensity 
than the adjustment of either wages or hours. As for differences across fi rm size, larger fi rms 
relied more on the adjustment of fl exible components of wages and temporary employment. 
Although fi rms in services sectors used all means of adjusting labour costs to a more intense 
extent, differences across sectors are not very large. More noticeable is the fact that fi rms with 
a fi rm-level collective bargaining agreement adjusted base wage with a higher probability, while 
opting out of collective bargaining agreements in 2013 is associated with higher probabilities 
of adjusting all the components of labour costs. Finally, and not surprisingly, a higher share of 
temporary employment provided for the burden of the adjustment falling upon employees under 
temporary contracts.
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lABOUR COST ADJUSTMENT AND FIRM´S DEMAND  CHART 3
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey. 
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The WDN3 Survey additionally explored how Spanish fi rms adjusted employment over 
this period. In particular, it provides information on the incidence of individual and collective 
dismissals, non-renewal of temporary contracts, freezes in new hires and the use of early 
retirement schemes. In Chart 4, we plot the share of fi rms reporting that each of the different 
strategies were relevant or very relevant when adjusting their employment levels over the period 
2010-20134. It can be observed that reductions in employment were mainly through individual 
dismissals and non-renewal of temporary contracts, although the decrease in new hires was 
also quite frequent. These data are in line with the observed increase in gross job fl ows seen 
in Spanish LFS data, which show a large increase in employment exits since the beginning of 
the crisis along with a marked decrease in hires. On the contrary, collective lay-offs and working 
hours adjustments played a minor role in the reduction of employment. Chart A4 in the Appendix 
shows some relevant differences across fi rms of different size in this regard. In particular, the 
non-renewal of temporary contracts was the main way to adjust employment in very large fi rms 
and these fi rms, more intensively than smaller ones, also used other ways to adjust their labour 
force, such as temporary collective lay-offs, reduction of agency workers, collective lay-offs and 
early retirement schemes.
As for wage adjustments, Table 7 confi rms that the proportion of fi rms reducing base 
wages over this period was quite small, while some adjustments in the fl exible component of 
wages were more frequent. This issue is further investigated in the WDN3 Survey by requiring 
information about the incidence of wage cuts and wage freezes, the relevance of infl ation 
adjustment clauses in wage changes, and alternative ways to adjust wages. 
As for wage cuts and wage freezes, the data collected by the WDN3 Survey show 
(see Chart 5) an increasing relevance of nominal wage rigidities, as the share of fi rms reporting 
wage freezes reached almost 20% between 2011 and 2013, rising from close to 15% in 2010 
4  In Chart A3, we plot the same type of information using employment weights instead of fi rm weights. The picture is quite 
similar, with individual dismissals and non-renewal of temporary contracts being the main ways to adjust employment 
once we take into account the employment share of fi rms interviewed in the sample.
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and from much lower fi gures in the pre-crisis period (around 2% in 2008 according to the 
WDN1 survey). This evidence is also consistent with the information provided by Social Security 
records.5 Despite the intensity of the crisis, only 3.3% of fi rms reported having cut wages to their 
employees in 2013, although this percentage was moving on a slightly increasing path from 
1.6% in 2010 (according to WDN1, wage cuts were practically inexistent in the pre-crisis period).
As for indexation, most Spanish collective bargaining agreements used to include cost-
of-living allowances adjusting wages to infl ation. However, during the crisis, the proportion of 
fi rms applying this type of wage adjustment declined (see Chart 6). In particular, the share of 
fi rms reporting that wages were indexed to infl ation decreased from about 50% in the period 
prior to 2010 to 37.2% in 2013.6
5 According to this information, wage freezes accounted for around 30% of job-stayers in the private sector.
6  It should be no? ced that in the WDN1 survey, around 70% of Spanish fi rms reported some rela? onship between wages and 
infl a? on.
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Among the reasons behind this lower incidence of wage indexation, low infl ation seems 
to be the main factor: in 2013, 14.1% of fi rms stated that it was the main reason for not adjusting 
wages to infl ation. Moreover, we also fi nd an increasing share of fi rms reporting the inexistence 
of infl ation-adjustment clauses, which is in line with the information provided by statistics on 
collective bargaining agreements. Finally, as for wages for new hires, 24.4% of fi rms reported 
them to be lower than for incumbent workers over the period 2010-2013, while this share was 
16.6% before 2010 (see Chart 7).
Regarding other ways to facilitate wage adjustments, only 3.4% of Spanish fi rms 
reported having opted out of collective agreements in 2013. This is not a high percentage, 
especially when we take into account that in 2012 another labour market reform tried to increase 
fi rms’ opt-out possibilities in order to minimise the needs to adjust employment. In any case, 
it should be noted that the use of opt-outs was not uniform across fi rms. In particular, as can 
be seen in Table 7, opt-outs were mainly used by very large fi rms opting out from their own 
fi rm-level agreement. Thus, this possibility was mainly used by these fi rms as an additional tool 
to renegotiate the labour market conditions of their own collective agreement. Furthermore, 
the share of small and medium size fi rms opting out from sectoral agreements was fairly low 
in 2013. Moreover, the 2012 labour market reform additionally eased conditions for unilateral 
modifi cations of those labour conditions set above the minimum level stipulated by collective 
agreements. In Table 8, we can also observe how these fl exibility measures have been more 
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Less than 20 20-50 emp 50-200 emp More than 200 emp Total
Opt-out from
    Sectoral agreements 3.9% 3.3% 2.0% 5.9% 3.7%
    Firm-level agreements 1.3% 3.5% 0.0% 16.6% 1.9%
Other ?exibility measures 14.3% 19.3% 18.9% 25.1% 15.6%
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey. 
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frequent than opt-outs (15.6% of fi rms), although again, they have been used mostly by larger 
fi rms (25.1% of fi rms with more than 200 employees have used these measures while only 
14.3% of fi rms under 20 employees reported having used them in 2013). Overall, these fi gures 
are in line with information on the use of the fl exibility mechanisms provided by Encuesta de 
Coyuntura Laboral and the Encuesta Annual Laboral surveys conducted by the Spanish Ministry 
of Employment.
4.3 Firms’ perceptions on labour market reforms 
The WDN3 Survey also questioned employers on their assessment of the recent legal 
amendments to the main institutions in the labour market. In particular, fi rms were asked to reply 
whether they considered that in 2013, in comparison with the situation in 2010, it was easier or 
more diffi cult to adjust labour costs in their fi rm adopting each of the decisions shown in Chart 
8. As can be seen in this chart, almost 50% of fi rms replied it was now easier to lay off workers 
based on economic reasons than it was in 2010, while only 10.8% of fi rms stated that it was 
now more diffi cult. According to employers’ perceptions, adjusting the level of employment 
was also easier in 2013 using collective lay-offs (for 42.7% of fi rms), while the change in labour 
conditions in the form of adjusting hours per employee (29.7%) and occupational mobility also 
seems to be easier in 2013 than it was before (28.4%). On the wage side, one-third of fi rms 
report that lowering new entrants’ wages in the fi rm has become easier, while adjusting wages 
of incumbent workers is easier only for 26.5% of fi rms. 
These changes in the fi rms´ perceptions about the diffi culties surrounding the different 
mechanisms to adjust their labour costs may be related to the labour market reforms approved 
in the Spanish economy over the recent period, but the impact of the severe and long-lasting 
crisis may also be playing a relevant role in facilitating some of these changes. To ascertain 
to what extent these legal amendments may explain these changes, the WDN3 Survey also 
requested employers to reply about the main factors behind these changes, allowing them to 
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choose between changes related to legal amendments, changes in the enforcement of the 
law, changes in unions’ behaviour or changes in workers’ attitudes. Table 9 shows that most 
fi rms reporting that it is easier to adjust the level of employment using economic dismissals 
(individual or collective) replied that changes in labour laws are the most relevant factor behind 
this easiness (between 75.3% and 83.4% in the case of individual and collective dismissals, 
respectively), although enforcement of the law has also played a role in this connection over 
this period. On the contrary, when we analyse which factors may explain higher wage fl exibility, 
fi rms’ replies tend to show that, although legal changes also matter, individual workers’ 
attitudes have been a key factor in explaining higher fl exibility since 2010. A similar picture 
emerges when we look at factors behind easiness in changes in working conditions (hours, 
mobility) where fi rms tend to reply that recent legal changes have a similar relevance to the 
change in workers’ attitudes.
Moreover, labour market reforms in Spain since 2010 have tried to facilitate the 
use of opting-out mechanisms in order to increase wage fl exibility in a collective bargaining 
mechanism characterised by the prevalence of sectoral-level agreements. In the previous 
section, however, we showed that these mechanisms have been relatively infrequent, with the 
exception of large fi rms that have used these new possibilities to renegotiate their fi rm-level 
agreement. The survey also requested some information about how fi rms perceive opting-out 
procedures having been eased in the more recent period. In Chart 9 we plot the share of fi rms 
reporting that opting out was easier in 2013 than it was in 2010 by fi rm size and the type 
of collective agreement of the fi rm. Very large fi rms (more than 200 employees) have clearly 
perceived an easiness of the procedure to implement and opt out of the collective agreement, 
especially those with a fi rm-level agreement (53.5%). On the contrary, a relatively small share 
of smaller fi rms stated that this procedure was easier following the different legislative changes 
introduced since 2010.
In order to further explore the reasons behind the low share of fi rms using opting-out 
mechanisms over this period despite the adverse economic situation facing them, the WDN3 
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Survey included a question about the possible reasons why these mechanisms were not easier 
in 2013 than in the past to those fi rms reporting that this was the case. Charts A5 to A7 in the 
Appendix show that most fi rms seem to be reluctant to use opt-outs owing to reasons related 
to their potential negative impact on workers’ effort or morale and fi rms´ reputation. It is telling 
that these reasons seem to be playing a relevant role irrespective of fi rm size, except in the case 
of very large fi rms with a fi rm-level agreement. Regarding the legal procedure, around 50% of 
Spanish fi rms state it is still too complicated and/or costly, although smaller fi rms do not tend 
to see greater diffi culties than larger fi rms. Again, the only exception is observed among larger 
fi rms which report greater legal diffi culties in the case of opt-outs from sectoral agreements 
(69% of fi rms), but this share is signifi cantly lower among these fi rms when they are opting out 
of a fi rm-level agreement.
4.4 Main obstacles to new permanent hires
Since 2008, not only did job destruction rapidly increase but also the job creation rate initiated 
a negative trend that has only quite recently been halted. In particular, since the beginning 
of 2014 we have observed an incipient recovery in the job creation rate although it is still 
quite moderate and mostly concentrated in temporary and part-time jobs. In this respect, the 
WDN3 Survey explored the main reasons that could be limiting permanent hires in the Spanish 
labour market. In this regard, most Spanish fi rms (close to 80%) report that uncertainty about 
economic conditions is an obstacle to permanent hires, although high labour costs (in the 
form of wages, non-wage labour costs) are also mentioned as a constraint for more than 60% 
of fi rms (see Chart 10). Dismissal costs are likewise mentioned for a relevant share of fi rms. On 
the contrary, although relevant to some extent, problems in access to fi nance or the existence 
of a skill mismatch between the unemployed and the requirements of fi rms seem to be playing 
a minor role in the lack of permanent hires in the Spanish labour market. However, by fi rm 
size, we observe some differences that show higher obstacles for smaller fi rms. In general, the 
ranking of different obstacles remain constant across the three categories considered, but for 
each of them smaller fi rms report a higher relevance of each of the factors. Differences seem 
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to be more signifi cant in problems of access to fi nance and in the relevance of wages and 
non-wage costs as obstacles to permanent hires.
Regarding hiring decisions, the duality between permanent and temporary contracts 
plays a key role in the Spanish labour market, since most initial hires are made using temporary 
contracts (more than 90% of total exits from unemployment) and the transition to a permanent 
contract usually takes place after a long period in the fi rm. On this issue, in Chart 11 we see how 
a large fraction of fi rms report that this transition does not usually take place (30%) while most 
fi rms tend to convert temporary contracts into permanent ones after the fi rst six months in the 
fi rm. Not surprisingly, the sooner this transition takes place in the fi rm, the lower the temporary 
rate is, with those fi rms reporting the conversion usually occurs after the third year being those 
with the highest temporary rate in our sample of fi rms. In Chart A8 in the Appendix we observe 
some relevant differences according to fi rm size. In particular, in larger fi rms (more than 50 
employees) conversion to a permanent contract is a more common practice and this conversion 
usually takes places earlier than in smaller fi rms.
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Finally, we explore fi rms’ opinions about a possible system of Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) that could seek to mitigate the duality in the labour market by having dismissal 
costs increase with tenure. On average, 57% of fi rms (representing 65% of employment) would 
be in favour of this system with more positive views on it from larger fi rms (almost 70% of larger 
fi rms would be in favour, see Chart 12). Concerning the reasons, fi rms that would prefer this 
system say that it would provide higher fl exibility to fi rms (82.5%), it would reduce segmentation 
between temporary and permanent workers (62.5%) and it would be more attractive to new 
workers in the fi rm (68.3%). On the contrary, the reasons alleged by fi rms opposed to this 
system are uncertainty about dismissal costs (68.2%), the amount of dismissal costs to fi rms 
(69.8%) and the potential diffi culties of altering labour conditions (54.7%). Charts A9 and A10 in 
the Appendix show how these perceptions vary across fi rms’ size. 
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5 Frequency of price and wage changes
As we show in Section 4.1, the tough economic conditions with lower demand prevailing in most 
fi rms led to falling prices at almost 50% of fi rms in the domestic market. We now analyse to what 
extent there has been also a change in price-setting behaviour over recent years, relying on the 
information provided by the WDN3 Survey on how fi rms set the price of their main product or 
service both in the domestic and the external market. 
Table 10 shows that the share of fi rms not having an independent pricing policy is 
relatively small, between 12% in the domestic market and 5% in the external market. Most 
fi rms state that their pricing policy consists of setting prices according to costs and a defi ned 
mark-up (44% in the domestic market and 48.7% in the external market), looking at their current 
economic situation to decide on the mark-up. Individual bargaining with customers is also an 
option for a signifi cant share of fi rms, especially in the external market (30.8%). Finally, the price in 
the domestic market is set following the main competitors by 18.7% of the fi rms, this being a less 
frequent strategy in the external market (13.9%). Sectoral differences in these pricing strategies 
tend to show that, in the domestic market, setting prices as a mark-up over costs is more 
frequent in manufacturing sectors, while in services there is a larger share of fi rms without an 
autonomous price-setting policy or with a policy of following the prices of the main competitors.
Domestic market External market
No autonomous price setting policy 12.04 4.98
The price is set following main competitors 18.69 13.93
The price is set according to costs and a mark-up
    Taking into account economic situation in 2013 32.38 34.16
    Taking into account economic situation in 2013
    and expected evolution 11.61 14.57
The price is negotiated individually with customers 22.60 30.83
Others 2.68 1.53
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey. 
PRICE SETTING IN SPANISH FIRMS DEPENDING ON THE DESTINATION MARKET TABLE 10
Total Manufacturing Trade Business services
Daily 8.2 4.4 13.6 5.4
Weekly 5.9 3.8 10.3 2.9
Monthly 11.0 8.2 15.2 8.7
Quarterly 9.4 9.4 11.6 7.0
Biannually 11.2 14.9 9.9 10.2
Yearly 43.4 46.8 33.9 50.2
Less than yearly 10.9 12.6 5.4 15.6
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.  
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Regarding the frequency of price changes, Table 11 shows that a large share of fi rms 
report that prices are changed only yearly or even with a lower frequency. In particular, 54.2% 
of Spanish fi rms reported this low frequency in changing their prices, this share being higher in 
manufacturing and business services. On the contrary, price stickiness seems to be lower in the 
trade sector, with 39.2% of fi rms saying they change their prices at least monthly (35.2% in the 
aggregate of the economy). In this regard, a lower frequency of wage changes is reported by 
fi rms, since the decrease in the share of fi rms stating wage change every year (from 52.6% to 
42.1%) did not occur as a consequence of more frequent changes. Set against this, the share 
of fi rms reporting that wages change every 2 years or less frequently has increased by almost 6 
pp. to 17% (see Chart 14).
We also investigated whether, over the more recent period, Spanish fi rms have 
increased the frequency of price changes, which could be interpreted as higher price fl exibility. 
As seen in Chart 13, almost 40% of fi rms have reported a change in the frequency of price 
changes since 2010 with most of them (25.6%) saying they currently adjust their prices more 
frequently than before 2010. 
Although no large differences are observed across sectors in this regard, a larger share 
of fi rms changing the frequency of price changes is observed in the business services sector 
(42.1%), with the largest share of fi rms increasing the frequency of price changes observed 
in the Trade sector (27.3%). On the reasons behind these changes, fi rms tend to state that 
higher demand volatility and a more competitive environment are the key drivers of their higher 
frequency of price changes. More frequent labour cost changes are the least relevant reason 
for the higher frequency of price changes, which is consistent with the lower frequency of wage 
changes reported by fi rms. 
In Table A3 in the appendix we provide estimates on this variable, attempting to 
control for composition effects. We clearly observe that a higher frequency of price changes is 
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associated with negative demand and fi nancial shocks, an increase in the degree of competition 
and higher total costs. While we do not observe, on average, any increase in the frequency 
of wage changes, those fi rms that actually increase this frequency tend also to increase the 
frequency of price changes.
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
More than yearly Yearly 1-2 years 2 years Less than every 2 years Never/not apply 
BEFORE 2010 2010-2013 
    
  
FREQUENCY OF WAGE CHANGES CHART 14
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1503
6 Concluding remarks
This report has documented some preliminary results from the 3rd wave of the WDN Survey in 
Spain. It provides some insights into the nature of the shocks (demand, credit, costs, among 
others) that affected Spanish fi rms over the period 2010-2013, when the crisis was most 
acute. It also offers some pointers as to how fi rms adjusted to those shocks and to what extent 
institutional changes in the labour markets are perceived as favourable for the adjustment. In this 
fi rst summary of the results, we focus on aggregate results although there seems to be some 
sectoral and fi rm differences (size, export orientation, ownership) that could also be informative 
with respect to the adjustment patterns of Spanish fi rms during the recent crisis. Overall, two 
main messages seem to arise from the responses of Spanish fi rms to the WDN3 Survey: i) 
reducing employment was the main instrument to accommodate negative shocks, while other 
means of adjustment (such as working hours and wages) played a secondary role; and ii) labour 
market reforms introduced during the crisis have, at least partially, eased the way so that Spanish 
fi rms can adjust to adverse economic conditions.
The wealth of microeconomic information in WDN3 and the fact that it provides 
harmonised information on these matters for 24 European countries make this dataset a very 
useful source of information for labour market research. In the near future, we plan to merge 
the information provided by the Spanish Survey with other fi rm datasets, which will signifi cantly 
widen the scope of research and policy issues that could be addressed. 
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APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL CHARTS AND TABLES
SOURCES: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey and National Accounts (INE).
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SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
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ADVANTAGES OF A NEW EPL SYSTEM WITH DISMISSAL COSTS INCREASING WITH TENURE CHART A.9 
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
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SHORTCOMINGS OF A NEW EPL SYSTEM WITH DISMISSAL COSTS INCREASING WITH TENURE CHART A.10 
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SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
NOTE: Bold ?gures represent signi?cance at 10%.
Demand Domestic demand External demand Access to ?nance Customers ability to pay
Utilities -0.14 -0.09 0.00 -0.18 -0.22
Trade 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.02
Business services 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.07
20-49 emp -0.10 -0.13 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07
50-199 empl -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10
More than 200 emp -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.07 -0.21
Subsidiary -0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.05 -0.08
Multi-establishment 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04
Foreign -0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.02
Observed probability 0.70 0.64 0.29 0.44 0.60
Observations 1975
PROBIT ESTIMATES (MARGINAL EFFECTS) ON THE PROBABILITY OF EACH NEGATIVE SHOCK TABLE A.1 
SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
NOTE: Bold ?gures denote signi?cance at 10%.
Base wages
Flexible component 
of wages
Permanent 
employment
Temporary 
employment
Hours per 
employee
Moderate decrease in demand 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.13
Strong decrease in demand 0.11 0.15 0.46 0.30 0.25
Moderate decrease in access to ?nance 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.05
Strong decrease in access to ?nances 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05
20-50 emp 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.04
50-200 empl 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.06
>200 emp 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.05
Utilities 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.29 -0.04
Trade -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.05
Other services 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01
Firm-level agreement 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.00
Opt-out in 2013 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.06
Temporary rate -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.03
PROBIT ESTIMATES ON THE DETERMINANTS OF ADJUSTING EACH COMPOMENT OF LABOUR COST TABLE A.2 
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SOURCE: Third wave Spanish WDN Survey.
DF/DX z DF/DX z
Decrease in demand 0.050 2.23 0.053 2.33
Decrease in access to ?nance 0.059 2.87 0.058 2.84
Higher degree of competition 0.196 9.53 0.196 9.55
Strong increase in total costs 0.082 2.52 0.085 2.61
20-50 emp 0.008 0.32 0.009 0.33
50-200 empl -0.032 -0.79 -0.032 -0.79
>200 emp -0.086 -1.39 -0.085 -1.36
Utilities 0.100 0.89 0.105 0.94
Trade 0.009 0.35 0.009 0.33
Other services -0.010 -0.39 -0.012 -0.48
Higher frequency of wage changes 0.130 2.37
PROBIT ESTIMATES ON THE PROBABILITY OF HIGHER FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGES TABLE A.3 
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